

1122

3 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] Meeting with [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] to discuss [REDACTED] number of subjects, including [REDACTED] meeting with Kissenger. [REDACTED] meeting with [REDACTED] Kissenger had been arranged by [REDACTED] who is close to the Nixon Administration and who can apparently be used sparingly. [REDACTED] is not anxious to use up his credit too fast with a man of [REDACTED] stature) by [REDACTED].

2. [REDACTED] had attended [REDACTED] with [REDACTED] who said that all of the Kennedy-Johnson ambassadorial appointees would be replaced as part of a move by the Republican Party to strengthen itself and make an impact by use of the patronage system. When asked whether sufficient qualified candidates were available to replace the present ambassadors, [REDACTED] said it would be a difficult job but that the changes will be made. He mentioned one candidate, close to Nixon, who will be sent either to Chile or Colombia. The decision on his assignment will depend on the importance of each of the two countries. When [REDACTED] was asked whether he would like to see this man sent to Chile, he said it would certainly be helpful to have a man who was so close to Nixon, especially in this critical time. [REDACTED] mentioned that the next six months in Chile were extremely important since the decisions on presidential candidacies, campaigns and party postures and platforms would be made. [REDACTED] was not advocating the removal of Ambassador Korry. He and [REDACTED] consider him

very competent and well-informed and the best US ambassador out of the last 10 sent to Chile.

3. [REDACTED] were disturbed about a statement last week by Meyer about the possibility of negotiations with Cuba and wanted to know whether this indicated that an Allende government would be acceptable to the US. [REDACTED] said these were two different questions and that the case of Cuba was separate and did not imply a policy toward a possible Allende government. [REDACTED] said that our policy had been that we could negotiate with Cuba but not with Castro. [REDACTED] will bring up the possibility of an Allende victory and US reaction with Kissenger on [REDACTED]. He had discussed it [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] commented that Republican politicals could be presented with the argument that the Nixon Administration might be unhappy to face the US November 1970 congressional elections after witnessing a FRAP/Allende victory in Chile. [REDACTED] was impressed by this point and [REDACTED] will probably bring it up with Kissenger in his attempt to find out what priority is assigned to Chile by the Administration.

4. The future of [REDACTED] was discussed and it was made clear to [REDACTED] that we had absolutely no mandate to support a particular presidential candidate at this time, that we might never get such a mandate, and that our interest in 1970 might very well be limited to attacking the FRAP. We wanted to clear up any doubts that [REDACTED] could be turned into a vehicle for Alessandri. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was committed to no specific candidate and that it would make its decision later on based on purely pragmatic reasoning--the best man in terms of their own interests who had a chance to win. He specifically stated that [REDACTED] was not pro-Alessandri, the two do not even speak. [REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] was indeed suited to attacking the FRAP via broad spectrum prop, and that it was also anxious to build up vehicles (such as [REDACTED] groups--this was implied, not stated) that could engage in this sort of work and which would also be available for more specific direction if this became desirable. [REDACTED] would not however support Tomic.

6. On the basis of the discussion of [REDACTED] it appears that we can arrange a profitable working relationship that will result in good, effective broad spectrum propaganda targetted at the Chilean Left. There is an understanding, and it was stated to [REDACTED] that should undertake activities not in line with our policy, we would disengage. [REDACTED] in an earlier discussion with [REDACTED] had stated that he would want to end this particular relationship if US policy required [REDACTED] to undertake activities which [REDACTED] believed inimical to its interests. Our goals and limitations have been made clear to [REDACTED] and

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

8.

[REDACTED]

9.

[REDACTED]

10.

[REDACTED]

11.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]